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INTRODUCTION 
On April 23–24, 2012, Fordham Law School hosted a Conference, 
The Law: Business or Profession? The Continuing Relevance of 
Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of Law in the Twenty-First 
Century, co-sponsored by the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, 
Touro Law Center, and the Fordham Urban Law Journal.1 
 
* Professor of Law & Director of the Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center.  I 
thank Fordham Law School for hosting the Conference, and in particular, Bruce 
Green, Director of the Stein Center, Russ Pearce, Co-Director, and Sherri Levine, 
Associate Director, as well as the editors and staff of the Fordham Urban Law 
Journal, for all of their work on the Conference.  In addition, I thank Dean Patty 
Salkin and former Dean Larry Raful for their support and Touro Law Center for co-
sponsoring the Conference.   
 1. See LOUIS STEIN CTR. FOR LAW & ETHICS ET AL., Conference Program and 
Schedule, The Law: Business or Profession? The Continuing Relevance of Julius 
Henry Cohen for the Practice of Law in the Twenty-First Century (Apr. 23–24, 2012), 
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Julius Henry Cohen was an influential lawyer who played a 
substantial role in numerous matters of public interest in the first half 
of the twentieth century.2  For example, Cohen assisted in the 
formation of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and 
served as its general counsel for more than twenty years; he served as 
a founding member of the American Arbitration Association; along 
with Louis Brandeis, he helped resolve the 1910 garment workers’ 
strike in New York;3 and, in opposition to Louis Marshall and much 
of the legal establishment, he defended the 1920 Emergency Rent 
Laws through the New York Court system up to the United States 
Supreme Court.4 
Yet, for scholars of legal ethics and the legal profession, Cohen’s 
most significant legacy may be his landmark book, The Law: Business 
or Profession?, published in 1916.5  Cohen’s book represents the first 
full-length consideration of the business/profession dichotomy,6 an 
issue that attracted considerable attention around the turn of the 
twentieth century7 and has remained a perennial concern for legal 
scholars and practitioners alike.8 
 
available at http://calendars.fordham.edu/displaymedia.aspx?whatToDo=attch& 
id=75; Touro Law Co-Sponsors Conference on Law as Business or Profession, 
TOURO L. (Apr. 19, 2012), http://law.touro.edu/News/NewsDetails.aspx?id=107. 
 2. See JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THEY BUILDED BETTER THAN THEY KNEW 
(1946); Gerald Fetner, Public Power and Professional Responsibility: Julius Henry 
Cohen and The Origins of Public Authority, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 15 (1977); Samuel 
J. Levine, Louis Marshall, Julius Henry Cohen, Benjamin Cardozo, and the New 
York Emergency Rent Laws of 1920: A Case Study in the Role of Jewish Lawyers 
and Jewish Law in Early Twentieth Century Public Interest Litigation, 33 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 1 (2008); J.H. Cohen Dies; Ex-Counsel to Port Authority, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., 
Oct. 7, 1950, at 12; Julius Cohen, 77, Lawyer 53 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1950, at 19; 
Necrological: Julius Henry Cohen, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 18, 1950. 
 3. See sources cited supra note 2. 
 4. See Levine, supra note 2, passim. 
 5. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (1916). 
 6. See Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of 
the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth 
Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 2 n.5 (2005).  The phrase 
“business-profession dichotomy” was coined by Russ Pearce. See Russell G. Pearce, 
The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will 
Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1230 
(1995). 
 7. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO 
F.D.R. 158–63 & 160 n.6 (1955) (citing sources); Laura Kalman, Professing Law: Elite 
Law School Professors in the Twentieth Century, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S 
CENTURY 337 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002); Levine, supra note 6, at 1 n.1 (citing 
George W. Bristol, The Passing of the Legal Profession, 22 YALE L.J. 590 (1913); 
Robert Treat Platt, The Decadence of Law as a Profession and Its Growth as a 
LEVINE_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:43 PM 
2012] FOREWORD 3 
In exploring the question posed succinctly in the title of his book, 
Cohen closely examined a number of aspects of legal practice that, 
nearly one hundred years later, remain central in the work of both 
scholars and bar associations.  Among other issues, Cohen addressed: 
standards of legal education, including evening law school programs;9 
standards of admission to the bar, including discrimination on the 
basis of race or ethnicity;10 prohibitions on unauthorized practice of 
law and lay participation in legal practice;11 the structure and 
atmosphere of large corporate law firms and the commercialization of 
legal practice;12 advertising for lawyers;13 and the role of the lawyer in 
society.14 
Significantly, although Cohen was far from alone in raising 
concerns over changes in both law and society that threatened the 
status of law as a profession, Cohen’s discussions stand out in both 
the rigor of his analysis and the rhetoric of his arguments.  Cohen 
carefully avoids simplistic characterizations of legal practice, 
recognizing the inherently commercial nature of the work of lawyers 
while at the same time calling on lawyers to uphold the noble ideals 
of contributing to the good of society.15  Likewise, although Cohen 
insists on maintaining high standards of legal education and 
admission to the bar, he rejects outright the ugly prejudices that 
entered into both the discourse and the policies of many of his 
contemporaries.16  In place of empty platitudes and ugly rhetoric, 
Cohen’s advocacy of law as a profession relies on a thoughtful and 
intellectually honest consideration of the nature and relationship 
between salient aspects of law and society. 
 
Business, 12 YALE L.J. 441 (1903); George F. Shelton, Law as a Business, 10 YALE 
L.J. 275 (1901)). 
 8. See Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary 
Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core 
Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1130 & n.66 (2000) (describing “the perennial 
debate over whether law is a ‘profession’ or a ‘business’”). 
 9. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 44–141; Levine, supra note 6, at 16–20. 
 10. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 258–85; Levine, supra note 6, at 3–13. 
 11. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 258–85; Levine, supra note 6, at 20–24. 
 12. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 211–12; 239–41, 271–72; Levine, supra note 6, at 
29–33. 
 13. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 173–200; Levine, supra note 6, at 25–29. 
 14. See COHEN, supra note 5, passim. 
 15. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 5, at 109; 157–71; Levine, supra note 6, at 25–29. 
 16. See Samuel J. Levine, Professionalism Without Parochialism: Julius Henry 
Cohen, Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, and the Stories of Two Sons, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1339 (2003); Levine, supra note 6, at 3–20. 
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The Fordham Conference brought together scholars of legal ethics 
and the legal profession, representing a variety of scholarly interests, 
who engaged each other over the course of two days in a wide-
ranging consideration of the abiding relevance of the themes and 
analysis found in The Law: Business or Profession?  Echoing both the 
substance and tone of Cohen’s book, the Conference produced a 
thoughtful and open exchange of ideas and perspectives on the 
underlying question of whether to characterize the law and legal 
practice as a business or a profession.  Taking Cohen’s analysis as a 
springboard for further research, many of the participants examined 
the business/profession dichotomy in the context of contemporary 
and international legal practice, while a number of speakers applied 
interdisciplinary methodologies, undertaking modes of historical, 
sociological, and empirical analysis to consider some of the 
assumptions underlying views of law as a business or a profession. 
On a substantive level, the presentations at the Conference 
explored a number of interrelated and overlapping themes.  Building 
on the broad-ranging character of Cohen’s analysis, the speakers 
applied Cohen’s framework to a variety of concerns, both historical 
and contemporary, from the regulation of lawyers to broader 
considerations of the lawyer’s responsibilities to the client and to 
society.  Likewise, reflecting the complex nature of Cohen’s vision of 
professionalism, the participants expressed differing views of the 
business/profession dichotomy, ranging from those supporting the 
notion that law is and should be viewed as a profession, to others who 
prefer to adopt a business model for the practice of law, to still others 
who offer a more nuanced account that incorporates aspects of both.17 
I.  PROFESSIONALISM IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Among other notable aspects of his vision for the practice of law, 
Cohen’s articulation of law as a profession relied on an idealistic and 
intellectually honest appraisal of the qualities and virtues he deemed 
central to legal professionalism.18  He rejected the rhetoric of ethnic 
prejudice, classism, elitism, and general attitudes of exclusivity that 
often infected the discourse of many of Cohen’s friends, associates, 
 
 17. In addition to the papers collected in this Issue, the Conference proceedings 
included insightful comments by the panel moderators, Elizabeth Chambliss, Michele 
DeStefano, Thomas Morgan, Alexandra Lahav, Howard Erichson, Stephen Gillers, 
William Nelson, David Luban, and Susan Carle. See LOUIS STEIN CTR. FOR LAW & 
ETHICS ET AL., supra note 1. 
 18. See Levine, supra note 6, at 3–20. 
LEVINE_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:43 PM 
2012] FOREWORD 5 
and closest allies.19  As Rebecca Roiphe documents in her historical 
study of American legal professionalism, “the rhetoric of the 
professions has . . . been used to justify the exclusion of newcomers of 
all sorts, particularly ethnic and racial minorities and women.  It has 
been used to create hierarchies within the profession and reinforce 
unjustified monopolies.”20  In contrast, Roiphe notes, 
[Cohen] used the rhetoric of the professions to proclaim the 
potential for human transformation.  He used professionalism to 
argue and fight for the removal of permanent barriers to admission 
and success.  In the same breath, he drew on the rhetoric of the 
professions to replace fixed barriers to success with contingent 
categories that individuals of whatever creed could transcend with 
hard work, dedication, and a strong moral sense.21 
Accordingly, Roiphe sets forth in an effort to “revive[] and 
defend[] a largely discredited history of professionalism.”22  Following 
a brief history and a helpful historiography of the place of the 
professions and the rhetoric of the professions in American society, 
Roiphe turns to Cohen’s life and work to illustrate her thesis.  
Although she acknowledges that professionalism was used by some 
“to exclude immigrants and establish a kind of professional 
aristocracy,”23 Roiphe concludes that “Cohen use[d] the rhetoric of 
the professions to argue that outsiders and immigrants become not 
only acceptable members of the profession but critical ones.  They 
connect the bar to a constantly changing democratic spirit while 
simultaneously controlling the meaning and interpretation of the 
country’s laws.”24 
Roiphe likewise concedes that Cohen’s “faith in the educational 
system to instill knowledge and virtue, reward merit, and provide 
equal opportunities to all certainly seems outdated.”25  Indeed, she 
suggests that Cohen may be something of a “relic,” advocating an 
“antiquated” form of professionalism.26  Still, Roiphe counters: 
 
 19. See id. 
 20. Rebecca Roiphe, A History of Professionalism: Julius Henry Cohen and the 
Professions as a Route to Citizenship, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 33, 34 (2012). 
 21. Id. at 38. 
 22. Id. at 33. 
 23. Id. at 59. 
 24. Id. at 61. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 38. 
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it is precisely the blend of elitism and equality in the professional 
ideal that makes it relevant and worth salvaging.  It is precisely the 
exclusivity that offers the real promise of success . . . .  The ideal 
gives individuals and the community as a whole something to strive 
for and demand.  As long as that is not completely futile then it is 
worthwhile to maintain the legal profession’s promise and try to 
make good on it.27 
Ultimately, Roiphe maintains, “there is a way of preserving the 
legal profession as a means of social integration without adopting the 
cultural hegemony of Cohen’s era or the arrogance of the melting pot 
ideal.”28  In short, “professions can play a critical part in a world 
which respects difference but seeks and embraces substantive 
common values at the same time.  The legal profession, in particular, 
can play an important role in negotiating and translating values in a 
heterogeneous world and working toward this set of shared goals.”29 
II.  PROFESSIONALISM AND THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS 
Other speakers at the Conference, who addressed the impact of 
professionalism and the rhetoric of professionalism on the regulation 
of lawyers, struck a decidedly more mixed—if not negative—note.  
For example, having labeled professionalism a “pathology,”30 Ted 
Schneyer repeatedly criticizes what he calls the “idiom” of 
professionalism,31 at one point referring to it as a “mantra in bar 
policymaking on the business aspects of law practice.”32 
Schneyer’s critique focuses, in part, on the decision in 2012 by the 
American Bar Association’s Commission on Ethics 20/20 declining to 
recommend that the ABA’s House of Delegates adopt any changes 
that would permit lawyers to practice law in firms owned by 
nonlawyers.33  According to Schneyer, this decision “meant heeding 
 
 27. Id. at 73. 
 28. Id. at 38. 
 29. Id. at 39. 
 30. Ted Schneyer, “Professionalism” as Pathology: The ABA’s Latest Policy 
Debate on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 75 
(2013). 
 31. Id., passim. 
 32. Id. at 87.  In a similar vein, others have analogized legal professionalism to a 
form of religious declaration. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on 
the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 263 (1995); Samuel J. Levine, 
Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and Heretics, 61 MD. L. REV. 217, 220 
(2002). 
 33. Schneyer, supra note 30, at 118–36. 
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the profession’s predominately negative attitude toward all forms of 
nonlawyer ownership of law practices.”34  Moreover, he finds, “[t]he 
nature of that negative reaction is revealed in the remarkably uniform 
rhetoric that opponents used to express their opposition.”35  Yet, 
Schneyer’s concern over the deleterious effects of the “idiom of 
professionalism” go well beyond this most recent incident.  Indeed, 
Schneyer undertakes a study of “the development and deployment of 
the idiom of professionalism from the early twentieth century to 
date.”36 
To be sure,  not unlike Roiphe, Schneyer does not ascribe to 
Cohen some of the negative rhetoric and motivations behind other 
campaigns for legal professionalism.   Recognizing that the idea of 
professionalism need not prove pathological, Schneyer acknowledges 
Cohen’s willingness to part ways with those whose motives were less 
noble than his own, characterizing Cohen as “an idealist, but not 
naïve.”37  Accordingly, Schneyer refers to Cohen as a “pioneer in 
building the institutions of professional self-regulation,”38 while 
accepting the sincerity of Cohen’s assertion that the effort to prevent 
unauthorized practice of law was intended to maintain the status of 
the legal profession as “exist[ing] primarily for the benefit of the 
community.”39 
Still, Schneyer concludes that Cohen helped develop a number of 
“foundational ideas to what eventually became a full-blown idiom or 
ideology of professionalism”40: (1) treating the business/profession 
distinction as “a sharp dichotomy”; (2) “ground[ing] the 
business/profession dichotomy on motives he considered to be in 
profound tension: profit-seeking in business versus public service in 
the legal profession”; (3) treating “market competition [as] a business 
phenomenon, inimical to professional solidarity, and, thus, a force 
that professional regulation should suppress, not promote”; and (4) 
maintaining “a commitment to professional self-regulation under the 
auspices of the organized bar (acting in tandem with the state 
supreme courts).”41 
 
 34. Id. at 83. 
 35. Id. at 84. 
 36. Id. at 85. 
 37. Id. at 91. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 93. 
 41. Id. 
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Schneyer reaches the disturbing conclusion that, as these aspects of 
professionalism evolved into an idiom or mantra followed by the 
organized bar, they had a negative impact on both the work of the 
ABA and, perhaps more ominously, the prospect he sees for the 
future of the ABA.  According to Schneyer, by relying on the rhetoric 
and attitudes underlying professionalism, the ABA established 
policies that “put in question the ABA’s legitimacy as the principal 
ethics rulemaker for legal practice.”42  As Schneyer notes, such a 
consequence “would be deeply ironic because preserving the bar’s 
privilege of self-regulation is one of the core values the idiom of 
professionalism treats as sacrosanct.”43 
Bruce Green and Jane Moriarty likewise build on Cohen’s work to 
critique another area of contemporary regulation of lawyers: the 
disciplinary process.  As Green and Moriarty observe, Cohen’s book 
begins with a chapter titled “Disbarment,”44 in which Cohen depicts a 
“reciprocal relationship between professionalism and discipline.”45  
Specifically, they explain, according to Cohen, “to maintain the 
practice of law as a profession, it was essential to have professional 
regulation,” while “a robust, well-functioning disciplinary process 
required lawyers’ willing participation, which would not be 
forthcoming absent a sense of commitment to law as a profession.”46  
In Cohen’s own words, “Take away the conception of the practice of 
law as a profession—make it a business—and at once you destroy the 
very basis of professional discipline.”47 
Placing Cohen’s views in historical context, Green and Moriarty 
note that Cohen “was describing the formal disciplinary process in its 
infancy,”48 and, they suggest, “[o]ne might expect that over the period 
from Cohen’s time to the present, courts would have developed an 
increasingly sophisticated understanding of lawyer deviance, not only 
from deciding many cases, but from following developments outside 
the field of attorney discipline.”49 
 
 42. Id. at 87. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Bruce Green & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Rehabilitating Lawyers: Perceptions 
of Deviance and its Cures in the Lawyer Reinstatement Process, 40 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 139, 141 (2012). 
 45. Id. at 142. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (quoting COHEN, supra note 5, at 22–23). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 144. 
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Disappointingly, however, they find that understandings about the 
causes and predictors of lawyer misconduct that underlie courts’ 
decisions about which “sanctioned lawyers should be allowed to 
resume the practice of law have not significantly evolved over the 
past century.”50  Indeed, in some respects, “courts’ decision-making 
about discipline and reinstatement remains virtually unchanged from 
their approach a century ago during the time of Julius Henry 
Cohen.”51  Of particular concern, “[a]lthough science has progressed 
in explaining behavior in the intervening century, courts have made 
virtually no use of insights from other disciplines in structuring their 
disciplinary decision making.”52 
Green and Moriarty aim to remedy this defect in the disciplinary 
process, taking into consideration “the wealth of information about 
human behavior that has developed since Cohen’s time” to “explore 
whether scientific insights can be useful to courts in the reinstatement 
process.”53  Focusing on lawyers sanctioned for conduct involving 
deception, the authors draw on social science to critique courts’ 
predictions about the behavior of readmitted lawyers as “based on 
little more than guesswork.”54 
Complementing Green and Moriarty’s critique of the disciplinary 
process, Susan Fortney finds contemporary notions of professionalism 
and the contemporary regulation of lawyers inadequate in holding 
lawyers accountable to clients in cases of professional liability.  As 
Fortney observes, Cohen’s vision of professionalism emphasized the 
responsibility of lawyers toward their clients: “Ours is a profession . . . 
We are all in one boat.  The sins of one of us are the sins of all of us.  
Come, gentlemen, let us clean house.”55  Thus, she explains, Cohen 
advocated principles that would promote accountability and serve to 
protect clients and the public from unethical conduct by lawyers.  For 
example, Cohen called for higher standards of legal education and 
bar admission, requiring that lawyers demonstrate “adequate learning 
and purity of character.”56  In addition, once admitted to the 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 145. 
 55. Susan Saab Fortney, Law as a Profession: Examining the Role of 
Accountability, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 177, 177 (2012) (quoting COHEN, supra note 
5, at 109) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56. Id. at 178 (quoting COHEN, supra note 5, at 288) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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profession, unethical lawyers should be subject to “prompt and 
summary accountability through a collective enterprise” among the 
practicing bar.57 
Nevertheless, Fortney notes, Cohen devoted “[f]ar less attention” 
to the “accountability of lawyers who depart from standards of care 
applicable in professional liability cases.”58  Finding a similar “gap” in 
contemporary approaches to the regulation of lawyers,59 Fortney 
considers “lawyers’ collective campaign to limit their vicarious 
liability, as well as developments related to lawyers carrying legal 
malpractice insurance.”60  According to Fortney, “[a]n examination of 
legislation and regulatory decisions related to lawyers’ professional 
liability over the last two decades reveals that accountability concerns 
may not have been adequately considered due to the absence of 
advocacy on behalf of consumers and the public.”61 
To support her conclusions, Fortney tracks the rise of the “limited 
liability movement,” which “resulted in the most radical departure 
from a civil liability regime holding lawyers accountable for the acts 
and omissions of their law partners.”62  As Fortney puts it, “[i]n 
lawyers’ campaign for limited liability, public protection was largely a 
secondary concern.”63 Indeed, she documents the role of bar 
association and bar-related groups in supporting legislation that 
“eliminated ‘even the moderate restrictions on limited liability.’”64  In 
the context of the rhetoric of professionalism, Fortney finds it 
particularly disappointing that “[b]ar leaders and other lawyers who 
preached the status of law as a profession said little about how the 
limited liability movement dramatically changed the remedies 
available to persons injured by lawyers’ acts and omissions.  Rather, 
lawyers operated out of self-interest.”65 
Moreover, Fortney uncovers a similar attitude among those who 
oppose rules that would mandate disclosure by lawyers who do not 
 
 57. Id. at 177. 
 58. Id. at 178. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 179. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 184 (quoting ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG 
AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM 
PARTNERSHIP ACT, AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (2001), at 14 
(2011)). 
 65. Id. at 186. 
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carry professional liability insurance.  Here too, she finds, “[m]any 
lawyers espouse professionalism rhetoric, while placing their own 
financial interests over those of clients and injured persons.  
Evidently, they do not agree that financial accountability is an 
important aspect of practicing law as a profession.”66 
In response to these concerns, Fortney urges law school educators 
and bar leaders to “challenge lawyers to examine the role that client 
protection plays in professional practice,”67 and she calls on courts to 
exercise their inherent authority to regulate lawyers in a way that 
“hold[s] them to strict accountability for the performance and 
observance of their professional duties.”68  Perhaps most pointedly, 
Fortney declares, “those who espouse the status of law as a profession 
should recognize and promote financial responsibility as a 
professional virtue.”69  Indeed, she argues, “[i]f we fail to protect 
those who rely on us, we fail to fulfill our obligations as a protected 
profession.”70 
To Fortney, the present conditions pose a stark choice: “[w]ill 
lawyers function as a trade group protecting their own personal 
interests over public interests, or will lawyers embrace accountability 
as a defining attribute of law as a profession?”71  Fortney insists that 
“[t]o answer this question, we need not take a position that law is a 
business or profession.”72  Instead, she concludes, “law is a business of 
relationships in which lawyer conduct should be guided by 
professional ideals and values. What distinguishes law practice from 
other business pursuits is how we treat, and remain accountable, to 
those who trust us.”73 
Nancy Moore’s complex analysis of contemporary American 
regulation of lawyers draws upon a variety of sources, including a 
close reading of Tom Morgan’s approach, captured in Morgan’s 
decidedly provocative declaration that “Law in America is not a 
profession—and that’s a good thing.”74  Morgan’s thesis relies, in large 
 
 66. Id. at 209. 
 67. Id. at 214. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 214–15. 
 73. Id. at 215. 
 74. Nancy J. Moore, Implications of Globalization for the Professional Status of 
Lawyers in the United States and Elsewhere, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217, 217 (2012) 
(quoting .THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 66 (2010)). 
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part, on the effects of globalization, including “radical changes in 
lawyer regulation recently enacted in the U.K. and Australia”75 that 
“permit not only nonlawyer participation in the management and 
ownership of law firms, but also the creation of entirely new business 
structures in which lawyers will combine with nonlawyers to provide a 
wide range of legal and nonlegal services.”76 
Moore acknowledges that: 
At first glance, these international developments appear to 
constitute unequivocal support for Morgan’s view that, if law ever 
was a profession in the US and elsewhere, globalization will 
inevitably hasten its demise, forcing lawyers into head-to-head 
competition with nonlawyers and encouraging them to combine with 
nonlawyers to form business structures just like those encountered 
elsewhere in the commercial world.77 
Nevertheless, she counters: 
[C]loser inspection may yield a different interpretation of these 
events. In my view, what globalization suggests is that U.S. lawyers 
should adopt a more nuanced view of the perennial debate, 
shedding light not only on what it means for an occupation to 
constitute a profession, but also on the question whether professions 
and professionalization might ultimately provide a net benefit to 
society and are therefore worth preserving, although in a somewhat 
different form than they have previously taken.78 
Likewise, Moore applies a careful analysis to the historical record.  
She “agree[s] that the early campaigners for educational 
requirements, proficiency examinations, licensing and prohibitions 
against unauthorized practice were motivated, at least in part, by a 
desire for both higher social standing and state protection from 
market competition.”79  Yet, Moore does not accept the notion that 
the “motivations of these early professionalism campaigners—either 
individually or in organizations like the ABA—were merely 
protectionist or that professionalism did not, at least sometimes, 
perform a genuine public service at the same time that it enhanced 
the standing and remuneration of the lawyers themselves.”80 
 
 75. Id. at 218. 
 76. Id. at 219. 
 77. Id. at 220. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 229. 
 80. Id. at 230. 
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Indeed, in some ways, Moore finds in Cohen’s vision an analogue 
to her own nuanced approach to legal professionalism.  Although she 
understands Cohen to adopt the “anachronistic” view that to be a 
profession, law has to reject the label and methods of business,81 
Moore finds abiding relevance and lessons in Cohen’s emphasis on 
“the potential public benefits of lawyers considering themselves to be 
professionals, with duties that differ significantly from those of 
business persons generally.”82 
Perhaps most significantly, with respect to lawyers’ self-regulation, 
Moore concludes that: 
[W]hile some of the activities of bar associations may have been 
motivated by or at least been entirely consistent with the interests of 
the lawyers themselves (such as efforts to enjoin the unauthorized 
practice of law), a substantial portion of the work of bar associations 
was directed toward distinguishing lawyers based on the existence of 
heightened duties towards clients and others, particularly courts.83 
Ultimately, Moore declares, “U.S. lawyers should themselves adopt 
a more nuanced view of the business/professionalism debate—one 
that focuses very carefully on the question whether continuing to 
permit lawyers to play a significant role in their own regulation is 
likely to provide a net benefit to society.”84 
III.  PROFESSIONALISM AND LAWYERS’ VIRTUES 
Other Conference speakers addressed broader questions of 
whether calls for professionalism help instill in lawyers a greater 
commitment to virtue and a stronger sense of fidelity to clients.  Here 
again, the speakers presented a variety of perspectives, looking to 
other professions and other countries, while employing a range of 
different methodologies including empirical and comparative 
frameworks. 
Sande Buhai begins her discussion by posing threshold questions: 
“What is a ‘profession’?  Is law a ‘profession’?  And why might 
anyone care?”85  Buhai first rejects the “trivial” definition of 
professions as requiring “prolonged training,” “formal qualification,” 
 
 81. Id. at 238. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 239. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Sande Buhai, Profession: A Definition, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 241, 242 
(2012). 
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and “knowledge of [a] field.”86  After all, she explains, “When lawyers 
assert that law is a ‘profession,’ not a business, they clearly mean 
something more.”87  Thus, Buhai refines her questions, borrowing at 
length from the introduction to Cohen’s book: 
Why should there be a class enjoying special privileges? Why should 
there be a group of men amenable to summary court process for 
professional misconduct? Why any standards of professional 
conduct? Why shouldn’t anyone be permitted to draw up papers, 
appear in court—argue about facts? What is the raise d’être of the 
whole professional scheme?  Why shouldn’t lawyers advertise or 
solicit business, as businessmen do?  Why shouldn’t they pay 
‘commissions’ for getting business?88 
In setting out to answer these questions, Buhai likewise rejects the 
simplistic assertion that lawyers evidence their professionalism 
through their “altruistic spirit.”89  Buhai responds rhetorically: 
“Altruistic?  Lawyers are professionals, not mere businessmen, 
because they are unusually altruistic?  Who are we kidding?  On this 
account, some lawyers may be ‘professionals’ but many, perhaps 
most, are not.”90  Instead, Buhai undertakes her analysis of law as a 
profession within the context of a broader examination of the 
“professions,” identifying and exploring “common characteristics” 
that law shares with medicine and accounting.91 
Specifically, Buhai finds that the professions all provide a service 
that requires specialized education and the exercise of independent 
judgment.92  As a result of the information disparities between 
professionals and their clients, “trust of the service provider . . . is . . . 
essential.”93  In turn, a professional earns the client’s trust by 
“put[ting] someone else’s interests ahead of [his] own and therefore 
requires an ethos different from business’s standard profit 
maximization norm.  Such an ethos supports internalized codes of 
conduct and occupational self-regulation . . . .”94  Moreover, 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 243 (quoting COHEN, supra note 5, at xiii–xiv). 
 89. Id. at 244. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 281. 
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professionals “have duties to the public in addition to duties to their 
individual clients.”95 
Having identified these distinguishing characteristics shared by 
professions, Buhai rejects the argument that “calling something a 
profession really does not have any added value.”96  Rather, she 
concludes, “[a]s clients or patients we expect that our professional 
service provider will put our interests above their own and use their 
best independent judgment to assist us, even while recognizing that 
they may have duties to the public as well.”97  In contrast, “[w]e do 
not necessarily have the same expectation that a shoe salesman will 
put their own interests in making a high commission aside when 
helping us find the right pair of shoes.”98  Finally, Buhai closes with 
the observation that “Julius Henry Cohen wrote his book at the 
beginning of this debate when it was important for many reasons to 
have lawyers viewed as professionals.  Even 100 years later, 
professionals still have an important role to play in our society.”99 
Turning to an international setting, Philip Genty similarly finds 
much to gain from professionalism, this time as applied to 
contemporary Russian legal practice.  Notably, as Genty observes, 
Cohen dedicated three chapters of his book to a comparative and 
historical survey of the practice of law in number of countries, 
including twelve pages that focus on the history of the legal 
profession in Russia.100  Reflecting upon his own experiences at a legal 
ethics conference in Moscow in November 2011, Genty finds that 
Cohen’s descriptions of Russia, though nearly a century old, “could 
easily be adapted to describe today’s Russian legal profession.”101 
For example, Genty cites Cohen’s depiction of reforms that had 
taken place in Russia in 1864, establishing a self-regulating bar, but 
one that included “a kind of ‘caste’ system made up of three tiers of 
lawyers, in descending order: ‘Counselors-at-Law,’ ‘Attorneys-at-
Law,’ and ‘Solicitors.’”102  As a result of the difference in status, 
“Counselors-at-Law and Attorneys-at-Law were members of the 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Phillip M. Genty, Dichotomy No Longer? The Role of the Private Business 
Sector in Educating the Future Russian Legal Professions, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
283, 283–84 (2012). 
 101. Id. at 286. 
 102. Id. at 285. 
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relevant General Assemblies, while Solicitors were not.  In addition, 
Attorneys-at-Law could rise to the status of Counselors-at-Law, while 
Solicitors could not.”103  As Genty explains, in Cohen’s view, “this 
three-tiered structure undermined the otherwise promising qualities 
of the developing Russian legal professions.”  In the words of a 
colleague quoted by Cohen: 
After an acquaintance of 22 years with the courts and lawyers of this 
country (America), I am led to believe that on the whole the 
professional standing of the lawyers in Russia is higher than it is 
here.  Of course, one must always bear in mind that this applies only 
to Counselors-at-Law, and the Attorneys-at-Law, who form a sort of 
aristocracy of the bar in Russia.  The “Solicitors” are, on the 
contrary, looked down upon as a lower estate.104 
Moving ahead to contemporary Russia, Genty observes that 
“[t]here is a robust set of ethical regulations in Russia.”105  However, 
“the ethical statute and the Code apply only to ‘advocates’” who 
comprise but one of at least five different Russian legal professions 
and around twelve percent of Russian lawyers.106 
Of particular relevance to a consideration—or reconsideration—of 
the business/profession dichotomy, Genty finds “fascinating” the 
participation of Russian law firms at the ethics conference he 
attended in Moscow, including substantial commitment in both 
resources and personnel.107  In identifying a possible motivation for 
law firm involvement in the conference, Genty suggests that, with 
“almost 90% of the lawyers operating without any clear ethical 
standards[,] . . . the efforts of the law firms to provide ethics education 
and, by extension, to promote efforts to bring all attorneys within the 
existing ethical standards, make perfect sense.”108  Specifically, 
“[c]lear professional standards for lawyers will ultimately improve the 
business climate by providing the stability and predictability that 
businesses require.  In other words, higher ethical standards in the 
legal professions are good for business.109 
According to Genty: 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 285–86 (quoting COHEN, supra note 5, at 75 (quoting correspondence 
from Dr. Isaac A. Hourwich)). 
 105. Id. at 286. 
 106. Id. at 287–88. 
 107. Id. at 293. 
 108. Id. at 294. 
 109. Id. 
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This congruence of commercial and ethical interests in Russia 
challenges the notion of a business-profession dichotomy.  The 
involvement of global law firms such as White & Case and DLA 
Piper indicates that the private sector has become a major force in 
promoting higher ethical standards within the legal professions.  
This union of the idealistic with the practical is undoubtedly a very 
good thing.  Those who wish to establish such standards for 
lawyers—to make them more “professional”—now have powerful 
allies in the commercial sector. 110 
Returning once more to Cohen, Genty wonders “whether Julius 
Henry Cohen could have envisioned such a thing and, if so, what he 
would have thought about it.”111  Genty reasons that, although Cohen 
“argues in The Law: Business or Profession? that the practice of law 
should not be about generating business, it seems likely that he would 
have applauded efforts to promote higher ethical standards even if 
they are undertaken, in part, for practical commercial motives.”112  
After all, Cohen’s “central mission was to instill a concept of 
professionalism in the Bar; in the case of law firms promoting higher 
ethical standards for business reasons, he might well have concluded 
that the end justifies these means.”113  Finally, Genty concludes, in 
light of Cohen’s “particular interest in Russia, he probably would 
have found these initiatives to be important and exciting, although he 
would likely have been distressed to learn that the challenges 
confronting the Russian professions today are similar to those he 
described in 1916.”114 
In an article co-authored with Christine Parker and Vibeke 
Lehmann Nielsen, Robert Rosen relies on both an international 
perspective and an empirical methodology to evaluate whether there 
is a “lawyer cast of mind” grounded in a notion of professionalism 
that entails not only “thinking like a lawyer” but also a degree of 
virtue and good character.115  To illustrate one response to this 
question, the authors look to Cohen’s vision of professionalism, in 
which “having a lawyer-identity is consequential to the lawyer’s 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 296. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Robert Eli Rosen, Christine E. Parker & Vibeke Lehmann, The Framing 
Effect of Professionalism: Is There a Lawyer Cast of Mind? Lessons from 
Compliance Programs, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 297, 299 (2012). 
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motives and actions and aligns them with ethics.”116  In fact, they 
suggest that “[t]he existence of a powerful lawyer cast of mind was 
crucial to . . . Cohen because it enabled him to implicate democratic 
values into the profession: Immigrants could become lawyers and 
they could join with non-immigrants to be forces for justice because 
they learned to think . . . alike.”117  In short, “[t]he lawyer cast of mind 
to Cohen . . . support[s] diversity in the legal profession [and] . . . 
makes possible common cause between lawyers.”118 
At the same time, the authors continue, “[t]his  position also meant 
that the guardians of the profession should be eternally vigilant to 
preserve the lawyer cast of mind since what can be acquired can also 
be lost. Julius Henry Cohen was one of those guardians.”119  Thus, 
Cohen also advocated preserving the lawyer cast of mind “by 
vigilantly imposing strictures on how lawyers behave, maintaining the 
‘dignity’ of the lawyer office, disciplining wayward lawyers, and 
regulating law schools.”120 
An alternative position maintains that  
virtue and good character are traits that are developed outside of 
legal training.  Who one is, not the lawyer cast of mind one has been 
educated into, informs ethical choices in legal practice.  One’s 
character is tested by law practice. Passing tests on professionalism 
bears little relation to behavior in practice.121 
Under this view, accordingly, “[l]egal practice . . . needs to be limited 
to good men.  Character and fitness committees should be 
emboldened to guard against miscreants entering the profession.”122 
Rosen and his co-author assess these alternative views in the 
context of considering “the framing effects of professionalism on 
organizational compliance structures and practices, with particular 
attention to the distinctive influence, if any, of the lawyer cast of 
mind.”123  Specifically, they ask, “When lawyers are compliance 
managers, do companies’ structures and practices of compliance 
differ from when a chief financial officer or specialized compliance 
professional, company secretary, or chief executive officer is the 
 
 116. Id. at 304. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 305. 
 119. Id. at 304. 
 120. Id. at 305 (quoting COHEN, supra note 5, at 313). 
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 123. Id. at 301. 
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manager of compliance?”124  In response, they “use survey data to 
measure the framing effects of professionalism and the distinctiveness 
of the lawyer cast of mind on compliance structures and practices.”125 
Based on their research, which employs an empirical study to apply 
a theoretical model to Australian businesses, the authors reach an 
intriguing finding: “for the most part, the professional background of 
the individual responsible for compliance in the company makes very 
little difference to the company’s compliance management structures 
and practices nor to its assessment of compliance risks.”126  The 
authors note some limited exceptions to these findings; for example, 
“[h]aving a lawyer in charge . . . has an effect on implementation of 
both formal compliance system elements and substantive compliance 
management through the lawyer’s influence on the firm’s increased 
perception of risk from third parties and the regulator.”127  They 
conclude, however, that there is little evidence “that having a lawyer 
in charge of compliance has any effect on compliance management in 
practice.”128 
Rosen and his co-authors are plainly disappointed with the “lack of 
evidence of the influence of a lawyer cast of mind in compliance 
management.”129  In response to the “idealization of the profession” 
and the belief in “[t]he ability of the profession[] to enter situations 
and remake them, bringing the weight of culture and a profound skill 
set,” the authors state bluntly that “[u]nfortunately, we find little 
evidence here.”130  Nevertheless, the authors close on a note of 
optimism, expressing the “hope” that 
our negative findings spur others to be explicit about the parameters 
and consequences of socialization by legal education and practice 
experiences. We hope our negative findings spur lawyers who come 
to lead compliance programs to do more than write manuals and 
lecture to employees, perhaps leading the company to substantively 
value compliance with the law.131 
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IV.  PROFESSIONALISM AND THE LAWYER’S ROLE IN SOCIETY 
Several other speakers at the Conference looked more broadly at 
the impact of professionalism on the lawyer’s role in society, 
including the lawyer’s obligation to promote the public good.  Once 
again, the speakers articulated different attitudes toward and 
understandings of Julius Henry Cohen, legal professionalism, and the 
business/profession dichotomy.  Rakesh Anand opens his article with 
praise for Cohen as “a man concerned with the social good” who 
“understood law to have a place in our thinking about that subject” 
and “also understood the professional practice associated with it to be 
an activity different in kind from the practice of commerce.”132  In 
short, Anand admires Cohen for “challeng[ing] the commercialization 
of the practice of law and, correspondingly, . . . defend[ing] a vision of 
lawyering as a profession.133 
Sharing many of Cohen’s concerns, Anand likewise laments what 
he views as the “increasing sway of commercialism” on contemporary 
legal practice.134  For Anand, however, the challenges of 
commercialism go beyond the business/profession dichotomy.  
Instead, Anand expands upon Cohen’s framework, addressing the 
“broad social issue” of “commercialism’s growing impact on society 
as a whole and how we might think about law and the role for lawyers 
in light of this state of affairs.”135  In so doing, Anand develops “a 
distinct perspective on the essential character of commercialism and 
law . . . understand[ing] each to be a cultural practice of a set of ideas 
and, as such, to be a way of knowing, or being in, the world, at least in 
the United States.”136  Accordingly, he explains: 
[T]he subject to be addressed is the growing influence of the cultural 
form of commercialism on society as a whole—or, more precisely, 
the growing influence of the cultural form of economics, 
commercialism being the practice of a set of economic ideas—and 
how we might think about the cultural form of law and the role for 
its most representative figures in light of this state of affairs.137 
Anand summarizes his analysis through three main points: 
 
 132. Rakesh K. Anand, Resisting Commercialism, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 369, 369 
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 137. Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted). 
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(a) . . . the cultural form of economics occupies a significant place in 
the American political order, one that has a pronounced, negative 
effect on society; (b) the cultural form of law offers the hope of an 
alternative mode of being in and through which to engage political 
life, one that provides for a more healthy social condition and, 
correspondingly, a space in and through which to resist the cultural 
form of economics and its negative social effects; and (c) the role for 
the lawyer in America today is to help realize the promise of the 
cultural form of law and, correspondingly, push against the 
manifestation of the cultural form of economics and its detrimental 
social consequences.138 
Or, as he puts it more broadly: 
[C]ause for concern exists—the American embrace of the cultural 
form of economics has put the political order in a bad place and, 
thus, the social situation is a troubled one—and the cultural form of 
law and the legal profession represent a locus within which to assist 
society in moving in the direction of change.139 
Addressing the specific role of the lawyer in contemporary 
American society, Anand contends that “[i]n confronting the 
challenges of the prevailing economic conditions in the United States, 
the legal profession must maintain a commitment to the legal way of 
life and the manner in which it organizes and understands 
experience.”140  Anand emphasizes, however, that “this boundary to 
conduct permits a wide array of action,” and that even “[t]o the 
extent that various parts of the profession need to restructure 
themselves, a broad range of possibilities is available to legal 
professionals.”141 
At the same time, Anand acknowledges that the boundary to 
conduct “does place a significant limitation on the behavior of the 
profession.  Specifically, any reorganization of any part of the 
profession must not arise from a commitment to the pursuit of profit 
per se.  It must not be rooted in a dedication to profit-
maximization.”142  Thus, he rejects proposals to open up private firms 
to outside investment or for law schools “to understand themselves in 
more business-oriented terms and in turn to adopt curriculums that 
 
 138. Id. at 372 (footnote omitted). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 390. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 391. 
LEVINE_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:43 PM 
22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
will produce graduates that are more market-ready.”143  Anand 
concludes his article with a call for action among lawyers to work to 
improve the American social condition.144 
Steven Hobbs similarly finds reason to praise Cohen for the social 
impact of his work and ideas.  Viewing Cohen through an 
“entrepreneurial lens,”145 Hobbs sees Cohen’s book “as an exercise in 
social entrepreneurship that goes beyond the mere question of 
whether the practice of law is a business or a profession and entails 
the question of what type of society Cohen desired to construct by 
having quality lawyers as he described them.”146  From this 
perspective, Hobbs depicts Cohen as envisioning “the looming threat 
to the profession as an opportunity to chart a higher path towards 
honor, integrity and professional excellence” and Cohen’s book as 
“the strategic planning process that identifies fiscal and human capital 
capable of achieving the vision.”147 
Indeed, according to Hobbs: 
Overall, what Cohen accomplishes is nothing less than a penetrating 
critique of the legal profession’s fall from grace and the 
countervailing wave of regulatory efforts to raise the organized Bar 
to a level of practice that would be the envy of the world.  The 
creative response to such a threat to the integrity of the Bar is the 
development of national and local bar associations designed to lift 
the professional character and credentials of the Bar and to 
discipline those who fail to meet baseline qualifications.148 
In short, Hobbs declares, “[Cohen’s] project is about making 
fundamental changes in the community of lawyers.”149 
Hobbs finds it “hardly surprising” that “Cohen viewed the world of 
practice from an entrepreneurial perspective.”150  After all, Cohen was 
“an entrepreneur of the highest rank and he tarried in several 
different vineyards.”151  As Hobbs puts it, Cohen was “the 
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quintessential social entrepreneur.”152  Cohen’s “life was animated by 
a commitment to creatively improve a variety of social systems.  He 
was a promoter, a person who could take ideas about recognized 
problems, push them, and . . . ensure that solutions came to 
fruition.”153 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the admiration he expresses for 
Cohen’s spirit of social entrepreneurship, Hobbs also expresses a 
considerable measure of disappointment in Cohen, portraying Cohen 
as removed from vital social issues revolving around race and civil 
rights.  According to Hobbs, Cohen’s “field of vision was limited in 
scope[,] . . . neglect[ing] the rapid social changes that were occurring 
at that time—changes of which an officer of the court, dedicated to 
the rule of law and the triumph of the administration of justice, 
should have been concerned.”154  Moreover, Cohen’s survey of noble 
attorneys “woefully misses some who were valiantly engaged in the 
pursuit of liberty, freedom and justice for all of America’s citizens. . . . 
[T]heir stories are written in many significant legal battles and their 
efforts to promote social justice.”155 
Notably, Hobbs observes, 
[W]ithin that pursuit of justice there were lawyers who acted in 
much the way Cohen would have found to be instrumental in 
developing a theory of ethics and professionalism . . . lawyers who 
were social engineers advocating in the best traditions of the 
profession to achieve revolutionary changes in the society . . . 
lawyers, both black and white, who were laboring in the vineyards of 
freedom156 
and others “who came of age during the time [Cohen] was engaged in 
his professionalism project.”157 
To be sure, Hobbs acknowledges both the perils of “view[ing] 
Cohen through the lens of contemporary historical knowledge” and 
“the fact that Cohen [is writing] primarily to lawyers involved in the 
business world.”158  Likewise, Hobbs “leave[s] for others the task of 
doing further forensic work on the psychological, intellectual, and 
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social motivations for the perspectives Julius Henry Cohen developed 
about the profession.”159 
Still, Hobbs insists, “[o]ne cannot proclaim a commitment to 
democratic ideals and miss the social tension that would shape (and 
continues to shape) the American odyssey.”160  Indeed, Hobbs 
concludes “[a]s an entrepreneurial lawyer steeped in the law of 
commerce, [Cohen] missed the teleological essence of his own 
work.”161  Specifically: 
We attorneys are professionals, but . . . in the sense that we have 
been licensed to exercise a special power that requires specialized 
training and experience.  The power can be exercised for good or for 
evil. . . .  Evil also applies to those in society who suppress the 
citizenship rights and human dignity of a significant portion of the 
nation.162 
Hobbs closes with the words of Charles Hamilton Houston: “A 
lawyer’s either a social engineer or he’s a parasite on society.”163  For 
Hobbs, “that is an alternative answer to what it means to be a 
professional.”164 
Likewise placing Cohen in historical context, Norman Spaulding 
offers a more heavily critical review of twentieth century legal 
professionalism, and—at least to some degree—of Cohen as well.  
Spaulding characterizes Cohen’s book as “utterly anachronistic” and 
“a prologue to the bar’s discredited regulatory venture in the 
twentieth century.”165  According to Spaulding, the themes Cohen sets 
forth in his book are familiar to any student of the history of the legal 
profession: “Nostalgia for the supposedly more tame, dignified, 
gentlemanly mores of the past is mixed with hand wringing about 
public anti-lawyer sentiment, increased commercialization, and lax 
standards of admission and discipline reducing the character, ethics, 
manners, and quality of the bar.”166  Moreover, he finds, Cohen’s 
“core argument picks up in the spirit” of other adherents to the 
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professionalism movement, “emphasizing ‘[t]he degree to which our 
profession has been commercialized since the Civil War.’”167 
Notwithstanding his stinging critique of the rhetoric, sentiment, 
and practices of the “culture of professionalism,”168 Spaulding is, at 
times, somewhat more charitable toward Cohen.  For example, 
Spaulding concludes that “Cohen was not naïve about the 
intersection between law and business,”169 and he finds Cohen 
“sincere”170 in his portrayal of a more idealized past, noting that 
Cohen “devotes several chapters [of his book] to comparative 
evidence running back to the classical period to establish that law was 
everywhere regarded as more than a mere trade concerned with 
profit.”171  Furthermore, apparently recognizing Cohen’s rejection of 
the classism that figured prominently in the discourse of many of 
Cohen’s contemporaries,172 Spaulding does not seem to include Cohen 
among the “anti-democratic element of the elite bar’s conception of 
professionalism.”173  Finally, in contrast to his harsh reading of 
Cohen’s book, Spaulding makes clear that “Cohen’s biography . . . , 
by all the evidence, suggests that he admirably embodied the ethic of 
service that was espoused by many elite lawyers searching for ways to 
mediate the contradictions of the profession’s ideals at the time.”174 
Indeed, Spaulding’s most sustained argument, criticizing Cohen’s 
book for “its remove from the modernist movement of the early 
1900s,”175 is directed more pointedly toward twenty-first century 
lawyers and contemporary advocates of the rhetoric of legal 
professionalism.  Like Hobbs, Spaulding contrasts Cohen’s attitudes 
with the dynamic changes that were concurrently taking place in 
American society.  While Hobbs emphasizes social changes reflected 
in the early civil rights movement, Spaulding focuses primarily on 
“modernists of the same period in the visual arts, architecture, music, 
and psychology, who sought to break decisively from bourgeois 
values, to openly challenge ‘conventional sensibilities,’ and to 
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cultivate a ‘principled self-scrutiny.’”176  In this context, Spaulding 
finds the early twentieth century “culture of professionalism” to have 
been “remarkably complacent.”177 
Turning his attention to the present, Spaulding declares, “[if] 
Cohen and his cohort can be forgiven for missing or ignoring the 
spirit of modernism, we twenty-first century lawyers cannot.  More 
than ever we need a modernist commitment to witheringly ‘principled 
self-scrutiny.’”178  Moreover, Spaulding insists, “that commitment 
would have to be shared by the bar’s internal critics, especially those 
in the legal academy, who are largely removed from the demands of 
practice and . . . as attached to the ‘conventional sensibilities’ of 
criticism as the bar has been to its protectionist project.”179 
Spaulding extends these arguments to critique a number of areas of 
contemporary legal practice.  For example, “principled self-scrutiny 
should expose the embarrassingly pervasive gaps between right and 
remedy for actual professional misconduct in the service of clients.  
There is currently no meaningful remedy for many common types of 
breach of professional duty.”180  In addition, “[u]nauthorized practice 
laws are embarrassingly over-inclusive and, for the most part, 
indifferent to the interests of the consumers of legal services they 
purport to protect,” while “[j]udicial over-enforcement of conflicts of 
interests via the disqualification remedy has reached nearly epidemic 
proportions.”181  According to Spaulding, “[m]odernist simplicity and 
honesty demand closing these right-remedy gaps.”182  “As 
importantly,” Spaulding continues, “if law is a machinery of 
government in a democratic society the legal profession should seek 
to maximize access to law, not maximize monopoly rents,”183 because 
“maximizing access is a far more credible foundation for the 
professional authority of lawyers in a democratic society than 
protectionism.”184  Thus, Spaulding concludes, “[c]losing the right-
remedy gap and maximizing access to legal services are but two of the 
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most basic reforms that would follow from embracing law as a useful 
art.”185 
Judith McMorrow likewise critiques efforts to portray the practice 
of law as a profession rather than a business, finding such models not 
only inadequate, but often detrimental to promoting the 
responsibilities of lawyers toward their clients and to society.  Like 
Spaulding, McMorrow reserves some words of praise for Cohen, 
while at the same time lamenting implications of professionalism for 
contemporary legal practice.  McMorrow refers to Cohen’s book as a 
“readable and thoughtful analysis”186 that emphasizes the value of 
lawyering to society.187  Nevertheless, she argues that Cohen’s 
“rhetorical device . . . ‘[law] versus business,’” precludes an integrated 
model that allows us to talk about the role of business best practices 
in achieving these goals, thereby “seriously impair[ing] our ability to 
address some of the central challenges to lawyers fulfilling these 
important values.”188 
Focusing on three areas of challenge to contemporary American 
lawyers, McMorrow contends that “improving adherence to core 
values requires not just training lawyers to internalize a model of 
professionalism, and continuing commitment to self-regulation in 
some form, but also implement[ing] improved business practices.”189  
Specifically, she delineates three compelling concerns: 
(i) the problem of neglect, poor client communication, and poor 
management of client funds; (ii) the need to improve the ethical 
infrastructures in practice setting to enhance both routine practice 
and ethical decision-making when lawyers confront ethical 
challenges, and (iii) the challenge of provid[ing] legal services to the 
poor and working class.190 
Through a careful examination of each of these issues, McMorrow 
concludes, “a significant part of our failures as a profession are 
business failures,” which “occur at the individual, firm and market 
levels.”191  Accordingly, “at each level we need to consider the 
business structures that enhance or impair improved practices,” 
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recognizing that “[b]usiness, good business, it not the enemy of 
lawyers but an important tool to implement our service profession.”192  
Therefore, in place of the “either/or approach” that adopts a 
“dichotomous” conception of law as either business or profession, 
McMorrow calls for a “sharper and richer discussion of the business 
perspective of professional practice,” incorporating “a stronger 
interdisciplinary conversation with the field of business ethics.”193  In 
short, “[w]e must envision business as both a partner and a tool to 
achieve our larger social goals.”194 
Still, despite her rejection of the “false dichotomy” between law as 
a business or profession195 and her call for “creative, unapologetic 
attention to the business of law” to “enhance ethics and 
professionalism,”196 McMorrow acknowledges that “obvious concerns 
arise.”197  Just as McMorrow rejects a professionalism model that 
ignores the business aspects of legal practice, she avoids an 
alternative model that simplistically embraces the characterization of 
law as a business.  In fact, notwithstanding her critique of certain 
elements of Cohen’s thesis, McMorrow relies on Cohen to “remind[] 
us of the limits of the business paradigm in our service business.”198  
As McMorrow further notes, “the concept of ‘business’ is just as vast 
and elastic as the word ‘profession.’  It has affirmative and negative 
manifestations.”199 
Instead, McMorrow advocates that lawyers “focus on the positive 
aspects of a service business: core values, excellent service, good 
infrastructure, proper capitalization, clear business plan, efficiencies, 
cost controls, and employee development,” in addition to forming “a 
powerful alignment with the field of business ethics” and “draw[ing] 
lessons from the expanding and creative field of corporate social 
responsibility.”200  Thus, she concludes “I do not see the business 
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aspects of legal services as bad or the enemy.  To provide legal 
services, lawyers must be good business people as well.”201 
Looking back at one particularly transformative era in American 
law, society, and culture, George Conk recounts his experiences at 
Rutgers Law School in Newark, New Jersey, from 1970 to 1974.  
Conk recalls that “[t]hree great shifts were underway, and Newark’s 
legal community and Rutgers Law School were at the heart of it 
all.”202  Specifically, as “African-Americans’ demands for an end to 
poverty and discrimination, the anti-war movement, and the women’s 
liberation movement converged,”203 legal education at Rutgers 
focused on “‘[p]overty law,’ civil rights and liberties, women’s rights, 
employment discrimination, and public education.”204 
This progressive focus was the result of the efforts of a core of 
faculty assembled at Rutgers-Newark in the mid 1960s “that would 
make great innovations in legal education—clinical education by 
professors who conceived of and built the school as a law-reform 
institution.”205  Conk characterizes the “key faculty” at Rutgers as “an 
honor roll of progressive lawyers” whose “creed was not neutral 
observation but to make a difference—for legal, social, and economic 
equality of all but particularly for African Americans and Latinos, to 
advance the rights of women, to expand and protect the fundamental 
rights of speech, privacy, and due process of law.”206  In addition, 
Rutgers was “far ahead of the curve in admitting women” and “its 
affirmative action program brought many minority students to the 
school,” while the school’s “Minority Student Program provided 
mentoring, internship and other guidance to minority students.”207 
For Conk, Rutgers “presented a model of engaged legal education 
that was and is unique,” such that he declares,  “[t]o my knowledge 
no other law school has been so thoroughly characterized by a broad 
progressive social agenda.”208  Indeed, Conk proudly asserts, 
“Newark—not Berkeley, Cambridge, New Haven, or Washington, 
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D.C.—was the most exciting place to be a law student or law 
professor in the mid 1960s to late 1970s.”209 
After recounting various examples in which “[t]he unique activism 
of Rutgers-Newark . . . had a huge impact in the development of the 
law,”210 Conk undertakes to answer the question: “Why Newark?”211  
In Conk’s view, four interrelated factors contributed to the 
significance of both Rutgers and Newark: First, Conk observes, “the 
sixties and seventies were the high water mark of public higher 
education.”212  As a public university, Rutgers offered a legal 
education that was “practically free,” allowing students to “enter[] 
law school with no dread of acquiring debt that would constrain our 
career choices.  Confident in American prosperity our concerns as 
students were for meaningful careers, not debt service.”213  Second, 
the “quiet leadership of Dean Willard Heckel brought extraordinary 
talent to the law school, and accommodated the activism of the 
clinical professors.”214  Third, “the spirit of the times gave great 
confidence to reformist litigators.”215  Fourth, “credit must be given to 
the New Jersey Supreme Court[’s] . . . progressive jurisprudence.”216 
Above all, though, Conk emphasizes: 
The activist faculty and the clinics engaged law students deeply in 
innovative and intense litigation regarding the most important and 
controversial issues of the day . . . .  No other law school in the 
country can begin to match its record in the 1970s. . . .  Students 
learned from extraordinarily talented lawyers whom they assisted.  
Their successes showed students how to succeed by really trying.  
We left Rutgers confident that we knew how to, and could, change 
the law, confident that we could make a difference.217 
In one of the final Conference presentations, Russell Pearce and 
Pam Jenoff offered an analytical framework to place in historical 
context the various themes that had been explored among the 
participants over the course of two days.  In so doing, the authors 
identify “five crises that faced the legal profession at the turn of the 
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twentieth century and that face the legal profession once again 
today.”218  Specifically, they address: 
(1) the debate regarding the vitality of the Business-Profession 
dichotomy; (2) the question of whether lawyers are responsible for 
encouraging business clients to pursue the public good; (3) the issue 
of whether lawyers should have control of the market for legal 
services; (4) the need to reform of legal education; and (5) the 
management of a dramatic increase in diversity in the legal 
profession.219 
Like other Conference participants, Pearce and Jenoff turn to 
Julius Henry Cohen’s book to provide historical perspective for each 
of these issues, finding that “the questions facing our profession today 
are surprisingly parallel” to those in Cohen’s time, and that “some 
problems that Cohen’s generation was able to resolve appear 
unsolvable today.”220  Thus, “[t]hese dynamics suggest a few factors 
worth considering in confronting today’s crises.”221 
“First” they argue “it appears that the profession will accomplish 
little simply by resisting change.  Cohen’s generation moved boldly to 
innovate.”222  In contrast, according to Pearce and Jenoff, “today the 
leaders of the profession appear to lack the vision or the energy for 
bold innovation.  If they fail to innovate, the legal profession will 
either stagnate or find itself at the mercy of outside forces.”223 
“Second,” the authors continue, “in evaluating challenges and 
reforms, the profession should prioritize its primary values and not 
necessarily cling to an irrational attachment to institutional 
arrangements that no longer serve those values.  It must, for example, 
ask whether restrictions are necessary to maintain lawyer 
independence and ethics, or primarily restrain competition.”224 
Ultimately, again echoing the views of many others at the 
Conference, they suggest that “[p]erhaps Cohen’s model of 
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professionalism without parochialism225 offers a valuable framework 
for beginning a reexamination of the status quo today.”226 
CONCLUSION 
Building on a portrait of Julius Henry Cohen and his vision of 
professionalism that emerged throughout the Conference, Pearce and 
Jenoff conclude that: 
Cohen’s hybrid and multi-faceted assessment reflects the reality 
that, even a century ago, the rigid distinction between business and 
profession, and the inclination to shun the former wholesale, was 
under strain when given close scrutiny in light of the realities of the 
world in which lawyers operated. . . .  As we integrate this reality 
into our understanding of what it means to be a lawyer, it is worth 
bearing in mind Cohen’s observation that exemplary businesses will 
reflect professional values.  Perhaps this framework will help 
provide a useful way for the legal profession today to navigate its 
role in the century to come.227 
Indeed, more generally, the works in this Conference Issue of the 
Fordham Urban Law Journal extend Cohen’s analysis to new and 
emerging dimensions of the study of legal practice and legal ethics.  
Thus, taken together, the scholarship presented at the Conference 
demonstrates that the concerns and ideas raised by Cohen in the early 
twentieth century remain not only relevant, but of vital importance to 
our understanding of the practice of law in the early twenty-first 
century. 
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